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Abstract
About a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game we will show the following results.
(1) Sion’s minimax theorem plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the min-
imax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
(2) The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by Sion’sminimax theorem
plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy.
Thus, they are equivalent. If a zero-sum game is asymmetric, maximin strategies and min-
imax strategies of players do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. If it is sym-
metric, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium.
However, with only the minimax theorem there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a
symmetric multi-person zero-sum game.
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We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous function and the
existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. We will show the
following results.
(1) Sion’s minimax theorem plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax
strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
(2) The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by Sion’s minimax theorem
plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy.
Thus, they are equivalent. An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization game
in a Cournot oligopoly. Suppose that there are 푛 ≥ 3 firms in an oligopolistic industry. Let 휋̄푖be the absolute profit of the 푖-th firm. Then, its relative profit is



















Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-sum game1. If
the oligopoly is asymmetric because the demand function is not symmetric (in a case of dif-
ferentiated goods) or firms have diﬀerent cost functions (in both homogeneous and diﬀeren-
tiated goods cases), maximin strategies and minimax strategies of firms do not correspond to
Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if the demand function is symmetric and the firms have
the same cost function, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash
equilibrium. With only the minimax theorem there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a
symmetric multi-person zero-sum game.
In Section 3 we will show the main results, and in Section 4 we present an example of an
asymmetric 푛-person zero-sum game.
2 Themodel and Sion’s minimax theorem
Consider a symmetric 푛-person zero-sum game with 푛 ≥ 3 as follows. There are 푛 players, 1,
2,… , 푛. The set of players is denoted by푁 . A vector of strategic variables is (푠1, 푠2,… , 푠푛) ∈
푆1 ×푆2 ×⋯×푆푛. 푆푖 is a convex and compact set in a linear topological space for each 푖 ∈ 푁 .The payoﬀ functions of the players are 𝑢푖(푠1, 푠2,… , 푠푛) for 푖 ∈ 푁 . We assume
𝑢푖 for each 푖 ∈ 푁 is continuous on 푆1×푆2×⋯×푆푛, quasi-concave on 푆푖 for each
푠푗 ∈ 푆푗 , 푗 ∈ 푁, 푗 ≠ 푖, and quasi-convex on 푆푗 for 푗 ∈ 푁, 푗 ≠ 푖 for each 푠푖 ∈ 푆푖.
1About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato
(2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a),
Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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Symmetry of a game means that the payoﬀ functions of the players are symmetric, and in the
payoﬀ function of each Player 푖, Players 푗 and 푘, 푗, 푘 ≠ 푖, are interchangeable. If the game is
symmetric and zero-sum, we have
푛∑
푖=1
𝑢푖(푠1, 푠2,… , 푠푛) = 0, (1)
for given (푠1, 푠2,… , 푠푛). Also all 푆푖’s are identical. Denote them by 푆.Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let 푋 and 푌 be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let 푓 ∶ 푋 × 푌 → ℝ be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first










We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Suppose that 푠푘 ∈ 푆푘 for all 푘 ∈ 푁 other than 푖 and 푗, 푗 ≠ 푖, are given. Denote a vector ofsuch 푠푘’s by 푠−푖,푗 . Then, 𝑢푖(푠1, 푠2,… , 푠푛) is written as 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗), and it is a function of 푠푖and 푠푗 . We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let 푗 ≠ 푖, and 푆푖 and 푆푗 be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear
topological spaces, and let 𝑢푖 ∶ 푆푖 × 푆푗 → ℝ given 푠−푖,푗 be a function that is continuous on





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆푗
max
푠푖∈푆푖
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗).
We assume that argmax푠푖∈푆푖 min푠푗∈푆푗 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) and argmin푠푗∈푆푗 max푠푖∈푆푖 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗)are unique, that is, single-valued for any pair of 푖 and 푗. By the maximum theorem they are
continuous in 푠−푖,푗 .Also, throughout this paper we assume that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy
of players in any situation are unique, and the best response of players in any situation is unique.













𝑢푘(푠푘, 푠푙, 푠−푘,푙) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆















𝑢푘(푠푘, 푠푙, 푠−푘,푙) = argmin푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) = max푠푗∈푆
min
푠푖∈푆





𝑢푗(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) = argmax푠푗∈푆
min
푠푖∈푆






𝑢푗(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 푠−푖,푗) for any 푖, 푗.
Assume (푠1, 푠2,… , 푠푛) = (푠, 푠,… , 푠), and let 퐬−푖,푗 be a vector of 푠푘, 푘 ∈ 푁, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗 suchthat 푠푘 = 푠. Then, for a symmetric game Lemma 2 is rewritten as follows.
Lemma 3. Let 푗 ≠ 푖, and 푆푖 and 푆푗 be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear
topological spaces, let 𝑢푖 ∶ 푆푖 × 푆푗 → ℝ given 퐬−푖,푗 be a function that is continuous on






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗) for any 푖, 푗.
3 Themain results
Consider a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. Let 푠∗푖 , 푖 ∈ 푁, bethe values of 푠푖’s which, respectively, maximize 𝑢푖, 푖 ∈ 푁, given 푠∗푗 , 푗 ≠ 푖, in a neighborhoodaround (푠∗1, 푠∗2,… , 푠∗푛) in 푆1 × 푆2 ×⋯ × 푆푛 = 푆푛. Then,
𝑢푖(푠∗1,… , 푠
∗
푖 ,… , 푠
∗
푛) ≥ 𝑢푖(푠∗1,… , 푠푖,… , 푠∗푛) for all 푠푖 ≠ 푠∗푖 , 푖 ∈ 푁.
If theNash equilibrium is symmetric, all 푠∗푖 ’s are equal at equilibria. Then, 𝑢푖(푠∗1,… , 푠∗푖 ,… , 푠∗푛)’sfor all 푖 are equal, and by the property of zero-sum game they are zero.
We show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game im-
plies Sion’s minimax theorem, and implies that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy
for each pair of players coincide at the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. (1) Let (푠∗, 푠∗,… , 푠∗) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of an 푛-person zero-sum
game. Then,
𝑢푖(푠∗, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = max푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) ≥ 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗). (2)
퐬∗−푖,푗 is a vector of 푠푘, 푘 ∈ 푁, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗 such that 푠푘 = 푠∗. Since the game is zero-sum,
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) + (푛 − 1)𝑢푗(푠푖, 푠
∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = 0, 푗 ≠ 푖
imply
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = −(푛 − 1)𝑢푗(푠푖, 푠
∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗).
This equation holds for any 푠푖. Thus,
argmax
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = argmin푠푖∈푆
𝑢푗(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗).
By the assumption of the uniqueness of the best responses, they are unique.
By the symmetry of the game,
argmax
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
𝑢푖(푠∗, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = 푠
∗.
Therefore,
𝑢푖(푠∗, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
𝑢푖(푠∗, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) ≤ 𝑢푖(푠∗, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗).
With (2), we get
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = 𝑢푖(푠
∗, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) ≤ max푠푖∈푆 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠∗, 퐬∗−푖,푗) (3)
=min
푠푗∈푆
𝑢푖(푠∗, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) ≤ max푠푖∈푆 min푠푗∈푆 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗).
On the other hand, since
min
푠푗∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) ≤ max푠푖∈푆 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗).





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) ≤ min푠푗∈푆 max푠푖∈푆 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗).





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆














𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆

















𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = argmax푠푖∈푆











𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆







𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬∗−푖,푗).
Next we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Sion’s minimax theorem plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the
minimax strategy imply the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗). (4)





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗).
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Since 𝑢푖 is continuous and 푆 is compact, this function is also continuous. Thus, by the Glicks-berg fixed point theorem there exists a fixed point. Denote it by 푠̃. Let 퐬̃ = (푠̃, 푠̃,… , 푠̃). Then,





𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
𝑢푖(푠̃, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = max푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠̃, 퐬̃−푖,푗).
퐬̃−푖,푗 is a vector of 푠푘, 푘 ∈ 푁, 푘 ≠ 푖, 푗 such that 푠푘 = 푠̃. Since




𝑢푖(푠̃, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆




𝑢푖(푠̃, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = 푠̃.
Also, since




𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠̃, 퐬̃−푖,푗) = max푠푖∈푆
min
푠푗∈푆




𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠̃, 퐬̃−푖,푗) = argmax푠푖∈푆
min
푠푗∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) = 푠̃.
Therefore,
𝑢푖(푠̃, 푠푗 , 퐬̃−푖,푗) ≥ 𝑢푖(푠̃, 푠̃, 퐬̃−푖,푗) ≥ 𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠̃, 퐬̃−푖,푗),
and so (푠̃, 푠̃,… , 푠̃) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of an 푛-person zero-sum game.
4 Note on the case where (4) is not assumed.










𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬−푖,푗).
Let 푠̄ be the fixed point of the following function;
푠→ 푠1(푠).
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𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
𝑢푖(푠̄, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆
max
푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗).
퐬̄−푖,푗 is a vector of 푠푘, 푘 ∈ 푁, 푘 ≠ 푖 such that 푠푘 = 푠̄. Since
max
푠푖∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = min푠푗∈푆






𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = argmin푠푗∈푆
























𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = argmax푠푖∈푆
𝑢푖(푠푖, 푠2, 퐬̄−푖,푗) = 푠̄. (5)
Because the game is symmetric and zero-sum,
(푛 − 1)𝑢푖(푠̄, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) + 𝑢푗(푠̄, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = 0.
Thus,




𝑢푖(푠̄, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = argmax푠푗∈푆
𝑢푗(푠̄, 푠푗 , 퐬̄−푖,푗) = 푠2. (6)
(5) is applicable to each player other than one player denoted by 푗 in (6). Therefore, if 푠2 ≠ 푠̄,
there may exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium denoted as follows.
(푠̄,… , 푠̄, 푠2, 푠̄,… , 푠̄)
In which only 푠푗 = 푠2. Of course, Theorem 1 means that there always exists a symmetric Nashequilibrium. Thus, in this case we have multiple equilibria.
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5 Example of asymmetric multi-person zero-sum game
Consider a three-person game. Suppose that the payoﬀ functions of players are
휋1 = (푎 − 푠1 − 푠2 − 푠3)푠1 − 푐1푠1 −
1
2
[(푎 − 푠2 − 푠1 − 푠3)푠2 − 푐2푠2 + (푎 − 푠3 − 푠2 − 푠1)푠3 − 푐3푠3],
휋2 = (푎 − 푠2 − 푠1 − 푠3)푠2 − 푐2푠2 −
1
2
[(푎 − 푠1 − 푠2 − 푠3)푠1 − 푐1푠1 + (푎 − 푠3 − 푠2 − 푠1)푠3 − 푐3푠3],
and
휋3 = (푎 − 푠3 − 푠2 − 푠1)푠3 − 푐3푠3 −
1
2
[(푎 − 푠1 − 푠2 − 푠3)푠1 − 푐1푠1 + (푎 − 푠2 − 푠1 − 푠3)푠2 − 푐2푠2].
This is a model of relative profit maximization in a three firms Cournot oligopoly with constant
marginal costs and zero fixed cost producing a homogeneous good. 푠푖, 푖 = 1, 2, 3, are theoutputs of the firms. The conditions for maximization of 휋푖, 푖 = 1, 2, 3, are
휕휋1
휕푠1
= 푎 − 2푠1 − (푠2 + 푠3) − 푐1 +
1
2
(푠2 + 푠3) = 0,
휕휋2
휕푠2
= 푎 − 2푠2 − (푠1 + 푠3) − 푐2 +
1
2




= 푎 − 2푠3 − (푠2 + 푠1) − 푐3 +
1
2
(푠2 + 푠1) = 0.
The Nash equilibrium strategies are
푠1 =
3푎 − 5푐1 + 푐2 + 푐3
9
, 푠2 =
3푎 − 5푐2 + 푐1 + 푐3
9
, 푠3 =
3푎 − 5푐3 + 푐2 + 푐1
9
. (7)
We consider maximin and minimax strategy about Player 1 and 2. The condition for min-
imization of 휋1 with respect to 푠2 is 휕휋1휕푠2 = 0. Denote 푠2 which satisfies this condition by
푠2(푠1, 푠3), and substitute it into 휋1. Then, the condition for maximization of 휋1 with respect to









We call the strategy of Player 1 obtained from these conditions the maximin strategy of Player
1 to Player 2. It is denoted by argmax푠1 min푠2 휋1. The condition for maximization of 휋1 with










We call the strategy of Player 2 obtained from these conditions the minimax strategy of Player














6푎 − 9푠3 − 2푐1 − 4푐2
9
.














































































6푎 − 9푠1 − 2푐3 − 4푐2
9
.
If the game is asymmetric, for example, 푐2 ≠ 푐3, argmax푠1 min푠2 휋1 ≠ argmax푠1 min푠3 휋1,



























All of the Nash equilibrium strategies of the players in (7) are also equal to 푎−푐1
3
. Assume




























































Therefore, the maximin strategy, the minimax strategy and the Nash equilibrium strategy for
all players are equal.
6 Concluding Remark
In this paper we have shown that Sion’s minimax theorem plus coincidence of the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy is equivalent to the existence of a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. As we have shown in Section 4, if a game
is asymmetric, the equivalence result does not hold.
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